connectors:read
or settings:write (the full list is below). Grant a client the least it needs.
These are not the conduit:* permissions an interactive MCP client requests
when a person authorizes it
— those attenuate a signed-in user’s own access, while an API client’s scopes
are its entire access.
Each scope maps to one area of workspace settings. read grants viewing it;
write grants changing it.
Identity inventory is read-only:
sso:read and provisioning:read can inspect
sanitized settings and mappings, but no API-client scope can create or modify
identity providers or SCIM tokens. Those writes govern who can sign in or be
provisioned as a human. Invites, API-client management itself, changing people’s
roles, and workspace telemetry configuration are likewise not on the
API-client surface in this release.
What no API client can do
The rule behind these limits: an API client can keep your workspace’s state in sync, but it can never change who someone is or how they sign in, and never widen an agent’s own tool grants or whom it may act on behalf of. No scope grants any of the following:- Change who can sign in or how: identity providers, SCIM tokens, the workspace sign-in policy.
- Manage people’s standing: invites, roles, API clients themselves.
- Manage agents in any way: creating them, approving their Okta apps or a sign-in provider’s Agent access, the groups they belong to, or whom they may act on behalf of (Delegation).
-
Widen what an agent can reach through a shared setting. With
policies:write, an API client can’t:- use
UpdateGroupto add someone new to a group that an agent’s Delegation selects; - link a policy to a group an agent is in, or grant more tools through a policy linked to one.
connectors:write, an API client can’t:- create or redirect a connector covered by an agent’s ceiling, including through a wildcard grant. This refusal saves nothing. If only the OAuth client change widens access, the edit can save other connector fields before refusing that client change. Without a URL change, the stored OAuth client and grants stay as they were. A committed URL change removes the old destination’s grants and discovered OAuth client;
- use
DeleteConnectorto remove the custom server behind an app when a policy linked to a group an agent is in grants every tool of that app, including throughapp:*or*: the app goes back to Pipedream, and that grant would then reach all of Pipedream’s tools for it; - use
UpdateWorkspacePipedreamto switch Pipedream on, or to change its project, client ID, client secret or environment, while any agent is granted an app (app:<slug>,app:*or*).
permission_denied, including when other connector fields were saved before the OAuth client change was refused. Read the connector again before retrying. Concurrent connection edits can also returnaborted; reload the connector before retrying those. Narrowing changes still work: removing people, unlinking, renaming, removing or narrowing a policy’s entries, deleting the policy or group, and re-sending people the API or an admin already added. Make the widening change in Conduit as a workspace admin, or, for group membership, through your identity provider. The refusal doesn’t say which agent or how the group or policy reaches one, but it does show that the change affects an agent. - use
/mcp endpoint or call connector tools — a machine token is bound to the
API audience and is rejected at /mcp. Headless MCP access for API clients is a
planned follow-up.
